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This paper offers a new and very simple alternative to Bochvar’s well-
known nonsense – or meaninglessness – interpretation of Weak Kleene logic
[3]. To help orient discussion I begin by reviewing the familiar Strong Kleene
logic [8] and its standard interpretation; I then review Weak Kleene logic and
the standard (viz., Bochvar) interpretation. While I note a common worry
about the Bochvar interpretation my aim is only to give an alternative – and
I think very elegant – interpretation, not necessarily a replacement. The new
interpretation is given in §4, specifically in §4.3.
1 Strong Kleene and its standard interpretation
Strong Kleene logic (viz., K3) is familiar in philosophy.1 The set {1, .5, 0} of
semantic values has a natural interpretation: the value 1 is read as true; the
value 0 is read as false; and the third value 0.5 is read as gappy – neither
true nor false.2 This interpretation of the values is intended to motivate the
K3 treatment of connectives reflected in the familiar tables:
1For both Strong and (the target) Weak Kleene logics see [8] and secondary discussion
[2, 7, 10].
2Strictly, this is relative to a model (i.e., when the value of sentence ϕ has value 1 in a
model, ϕ is said to be true according to the model) but I leave this as implicit throughout.
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∧ 1 .5 0
1 1 .5 0
.5 .5 .5 0
0 0 0 0
∨ 1 .5 0
1 1 1 1
.5 1 .5 .5
0 1 .5 0
¬
1 0
.5 .5
0 1
In particular, a conjunction is false if at least one conjunct is false, and a dis-
junction is true if at least one disjunct is true. Having a (meaningful) gappy
sentence as a component doesn’t take away from the truth of a disjunction
that has at least one true disjunct, or from the falsity of a conjunction with
at least one false conjunct. Meaningful-but-gappy sentences result in com-
pound gaps only if there are insufficient classical-logic grounds for their truth
or falsity.
So much for the standard gappy interpretation of K3, which I assume to
be familiar. I turn to the target Weak Kleene logic.
2 Weak Kleene and the Bochvar interpretation
Strong Kleene logic has a ‘weak’ sibling, namely, Weak Kleene logic (WK3),
which is the focus of this paper. WK3 uses the set {1, .5, 0} of semantic
values but has a strikingly different approach to connectives from K3:
∧ 1 .5 0
1 1 .5 0
.5 .5 .5 .5
0 0 .5 0
∨ 1 .5 0
1 1 .5 1
.5 .5 .5 .5
0 1 .5 0
¬
1 0
.5 .5
0 1
Like K3 the treatment of connectives is exactly per classical logic when 0.5 is
completely absent. (To see this, simply block out the third row of each table
and third column of each binary-connective table.) Strikingly unlike K3 a
disjunction fails to be true if at least one disjunct is true, and a conjunction
fails to be false if at least one conjunct is false. What motivates this prima
facie puzzling treatment of connectives?
Here is where a philosophical interpretation comes into play. And here
is where Bochvar’s famous ‘meaningless’ (or ‘nonsense’) interpretation [3]
is standardly invoked. On this interpretation the values 1 and 0 are read
exactly as in K3 (viz., true and false, respectively); however, the third value
0.5 is read as meaningless, so that ϕ’s having value 0.5 is read as ϕ’s being
meaningless (in the given model). This interpretation is standardly taken to
motivate the given treatment of the connectives: a conjunction is meaningless
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if at least one conjunct is meaningless; and the same with a disjunction; and
the same with a negation.3
The WK3 consequence relation (the logic) is defined in terms of preserving
the value 1 (i.e., being true). An important invalidity in WK3 is the failure
of Addition (where addition is the form ϕ ∴ ϕ ∨ ψ), namely:
ϕ 0wk3 ϕ ∨ ψ.
A counterexample is any model in which ϕ has value 1 and ψ has value 0.5,
in which case (see table for disjunction) ϕ ∨ ψ has value 0.5.
One might find the failure of Addition to be strange, but the point of
Bochvar’s interpretation is to explain or motivate its failure. And the com-
mon view, which I do not aim to undermine, is that Addition ought to fail
if a meaningless disjunct can sneak into the picture, since – at least on the
driving background picture of ‘nonsense’ or ‘meaninglessness’ – the entire dis-
junction would thereby be meaningless. A meaningless bit makes the whole
thing meaningless. That’s Bochvar’s idea.
3 A worry about the Bochvar interpretation
One common worry about Bochvar’s interpretation is just this: when ϕ is
genuinely meaningless there’s a clear question of whether ϕ is even apt to
be logically conjoined (or disjoined or negated) to make a conjunction (dis-
junction, negation). The logical connectives are generally thought to take
meaningful sentences – indeed, on some accounts (of ‘propositional connec-
tives’), propositions – as input. This commonly held understanding of the
inputs of standard connectives is in prima facie tension with the Bochvar
interpretation, at least on a flat-footed understanding of it.
I share the given worry but am not endorsing it as an objection against
the Bochvar interpretation of WK3. Instead, I propose another interpretation
which is simple, elegant, and no less natural than the Bochvar interpretation.
3On this interpretation the third value is thought of as infectious and the treatment of
connectives is sometimes summarized by the slogan ‘a jot of rat’s dung [i.e., this infectious
value] spoils the soup’ [2]. (The slogan’s use in this context is often attributed to Bas van
Fraassen.)
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4 A new interpretation
4.1 Terminology: theories
Towards setting terminology think of a theory in the logician’s sense: namely,
a closed theory. In particular, think of a theory as a set of sentences closed
under a consequence relation. Following Tarski we think of a theory as
the set Cn(T ) of all consequences of T for some set of claims T , namely,
Cn(T ) = {ϕ : T ` ϕ}, where ` is a consequence relation. So, for example,
if one were to close a set X of sentences under K3 (or many other very
familiar logics) then ϕ ∨ ψ is in the resulting theory (viz., Cn(X)) if ϕ is
in the theory; however, since Addition fails in WK3, closing X under WK3
consequence won’t put ϕ ∨ ψ in Cn(X) simply because ϕ is in the theory.
For present purposes the important (though terminological) point is that
different consequence relations – different ‘logics’ – can result in different
theories even if one starts with the same initial (pre-closed) set of truths.
4.2 Motivating ideas
The proposed interpretation is motivated by the following ideas, all of which
I take to be prima facie plausible (and offer here without argument).
1. A theory is about all and only what its elements – that is, the claims
in the theory – are about.
2. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are about exactly whatever
their respective subsentences are about:
(a) Conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ is about exactly whatever ϕ and ψ are about.
(b) Disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ is about exactly whatever ϕ and ψ are about.
(c) Negation ¬ϕ is about exactly whatever ϕ is about.
3. Theories in English are rarely about every topic expressible in English.
Putting these simple ideas together tells against using mere truth-preserving
consequence as a relation under which all theories in English are closed. After
all, Addition is truth-preserving; however, it isn’t topic-preserving given (2b)
and (3). As per (2b) the disjunction of Grass is green and Brexit happened
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is about grass and Brexit; but, by way of a witness for (3), our true theory
of grass is not about Brexit. Addition can take theories off-topic.4
4.3 The proposed interpretation: off-topic
The foregoing ideas motivate a very simple but attractive interpretation of
WK3 as a logic that concerns not simply truth-preservation but truth-and-
topic preservation, where being off-topic is absolute.5 The proposal: read
the value 1 not simply as true but rather as true and on-topic, and similarly
0 as false and on-topic. Finally, read the third value 0.5 as off-topic. This
interpretation, I claim, motivates the WK3 treatment of connectives, at least
if the background motivating ideas (see §4.2) are held fixed.
Being on-topic, on this conception, is an absolute affair: ϕ is either true-
and-on-topic, false-and-on-topic or ϕ is off-topic – full stop. And given this
conception the WK3 treatment gets things right. Consider the on-topic cases:
so long as all sentences are on-topic – that is, that no sentence is off-topic (i.e.,
no sentence has value 0.5) – then the connectives enjoy a perfectly classical-
logic treatment. Consider the off-topic case. Let ϕ be off-topic. Then – given
(2a) – the conjunction of ϕ and any sentence ψ is off-topic. The same goes
for disjunction: a disjunction is off-topic if one of its disjuncts is off-topic.
And similarly for negation: ¬ϕ is off-topic given that ϕ is off-topic.
Not only does the proposed interpretation motivate the WK3 treatment
of the connectives in a simple and natural way; it motivates the account
of consequence as preserving value 1. In particular, while K3 cares only
about truth-preservation the concern of WK3, on the current interpretation,
is preservation of on-topic-truth (so to speak); and this motivates treating
only value 1 – namely, true-and-on-topic – as ‘designated’ (i.e., the value to
be preserved by the consequence relation).
4This observation about topics and Addition is not new; it is anticipated in work by De-
molombe and Jones [5], and even by Goodman [6] and by Buvacˇ et al [4], but none of these
authors advance the proposed interpretation of WK3 I give here. In Demolombe & Jones’
work, which is closest to my interest here, the proposed interpretation of WK3 is absent;
and indeed Demolombe & Jones reject essential background parts of my interpretation
such as (2b) and related principles. (The Demolombe & Jones work may be conflating
is relevant to topic t and is about topic t, which might explain their rejection of target
principles.) Pioneers of the relevant-to idea are Richard Angell [1] and William Parry [9] –
work that continues to inspire further work in the relevance/relevant-logic tradition.
5An alternative account might explore ‘partially off-topic’, but I do not see this as
delivering a natural interpretation of WK3 (which is my only concern here).
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5 Closing remark
While the two interpretations are different I note that the new interpretation
of WK3 need not be seen as a direct competitor to the Bochvar interpretation.
Not only need there be no interesting competition among such interpretations
(e.g., they can motivate different applications); one might even think of being
off-topic as one way of being ‘meaningless’. Maybe. My hope is only that
this paper puts the ‘off-topic’ interpretation on the philosophical table.6
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